Lido Lend: Accept Admin Roles and Approve Committee Mandates
Summary
This proposal seeks Lido DAO approval of Lido Lend, a decentralized lending protocol built on a modified fork of Morpho Blue, including its administrative role configuration and proposed committee mandates. Lido Lend is designed around isolated lending markets and three principal mechanisms:
- Fallback Exits: Allow lenders to exit using borrower collateral when available liquidity is insufficient, subject to settlement rules and limits.
- Guardian Security Council: Screens addresses depositing new collateral and may restrict borrowing from flagged addresses under defined conditions.
- Turbulence Controls: Enable market-specific freezes and temporary pauses through narrowly defined operational authorities.
The proposed governance framework includes three multisig committees: the Lend Operational Committee, the Lend Risk Steward Committee and the Lend Emergency Brakes Committee, along with market-specific Guardian Security Councils. The Lido DAO Agent holds contract upgrade and role-administration authority. The Lido Lend Easy Track factories are proposed for registration through separate execution items in the same Aragon vote. This vote does not approve or activate individual lending markets. Market creation, initial market parameters and Guardian Security Council membership will be determined separately, primarily through Easy Track motions that remain open to LDO holder objections.
Motivation and Protocol Design
Lido Lend is designed to address challenges in decentralized lending, particularly situations where lenders cannot withdraw because of insufficient liquidity or where compromised collateral introduces additional risks. The protocol follows a selective approach, with individually configured markets and additional controls over collateral maturation and emergency responses.
The underlying architecture uses a shared lending core with isolated accounting for each market. Every market is defined by five parameters: loan token, collateral token, oracle, interest-rate model (IRM), and Liquidation LTV (LLTV). Once created, these parameters, the controller address, and the settlement setting cannot be changed. Other settings, including supply caps and IRM configuration, may be adjusted through the authorized governance mechanisms.
The protocol introduces three mechanisms to support this design.
Fallback Exits
Fallback Exits provide an alternative withdrawal mechanism when available liquidity is insufficient. Instead of waiting for borrowers to repay, lenders may receive borrower collateral through settlement, with an equivalent amount of debt cancelled at the corresponding oracle valuation and without a liquidation incentive. Settlement targets the borrower at the top of the settlement queue. The queue is ordered by borrow shares per unit of collateral, so in practice this is the borrower with the highest LTV in the market.
Guardian Security Council
Each market has a Guardian Security Council responsible for screening wallet addresses depositing incoming collateral and the addresses from which such collateral originates for compromised assets, illicit activity or attempted protocol abuse.
New collateral counts toward position health immediately but cannot support additional borrowing until it matures.
Guardians submit flags and suspect reports on accounts, and either can extend the maturation time. When flags from distinct Guardians reach the required quorum, the account is banned from new borrowing and collateral maturation. Only a Guardian quorum can ban an account. Granting this authority to anyone else would require a Lido DAO vote.
A ban does not itself prevent repayment, liquidation, settlement, or debt-free collateral withdrawals. Guardians cannot remove bans, but a ban can be lifted through a Lend Operational Committee Easy Track motion. To prevent indefinite restrictions caused by unavailable Guardians, collateral may also mature after a fallback deadline if the required reports have not arrived.
Turbulence Controls
Turbulence Controls provide two levels of market-specific intervention:
- A freeze restricts new borrowing, collateral maturation, and collateral withdrawals from positions with outstanding debt, while allowing repayment, liquidation, settlement, and lender withdrawals to continue. The Lend Risk Steward Committee can impose a freeze, but lifting it requires a Lend Operational Committee Easy Track motion.
- A pause is a stronger measure that temporarily blocks operations routed through the market controller, including repayment, liquidation, and settlement. The Lend Emergency Brakes Committee may trigger one pause of a predefined duration, but cannot extend it or end it early. A further pause requires re-registration through a Lend Operational Committee Easy Track motion. Interest continues to accrue during a pause. The existing protocol-wide Reseal Manager mechanism also applies to Lido Lend: if Dual Governance is not in its normal state, the Reseal Manager can extend an active pause indefinitely, until the market is explicitly resumed.
Neither mechanism gives the committees custody of, or authority to transfer, user assets.
Governance and Committees
Three multisig committees would operate within defined limits, while the Lido DAO retains authority over contract upgrades and privileged role administration.
| Committee |
Threshold |
Members |
| Lend Operational Committee |
5/7 |
Bogdan K, Alexander T, Izzy, Willem, Eugene M, Mikhail G, Max |
| Lend Risk Steward Committee |
3/7 |
Bogdan K, Alexander T, Izzy, Willem, Eugene M, Mikhail G, Max |
| Lend Emergency Brakes Committee |
3/6 |
Bogdan K, Alexander T, Izzy, Sergey K, George A, Alexey P |
-
Lend Operational Committee. The committee acts exclusively through Easy Track factories, with motions subject to objections by LDO holders. Within the bounds of those factories, its authority includes:
- Creating and activating markets.
- Configuring supply caps, collateral maturation, settlement settings, market fees and IRM configuration.
- Managing Guardian membership and quorum, and unbanning accounts.
- Appointing Risk Stewards and configuring Emergency Brakes.
- Managing instant maturation privileges and unfreezing markets.
The committee cannot upgrade contracts, administer privileged roles, withdraw user positions, select borrowers for settlement or initiate settlement.
-
Lend Risk Steward Committee. The committee can act immediately to freeze a market, increase the maturation time, the non-matured capital lock and the supply collateral minimum, and revoke an address's instant maturation privilege. It cannot loosen any setting, unfreeze a market, change fees or interest rates, or upgrade contracts.
-
Lend Emergency Brakes Committee. The committee acts through CircuitBreaker, subject to periodic heartbeat requirements. It can trigger one fixed-duration pause for a registered market controller but cannot select its duration, extend or end the pause, or trigger another pause of the same controller without re-registration through a Lend Operational Committee Easy Track motion.
-
Guardian Security Councils. The Councils operate per market. Their members and quorum are established as part of the relevant market's onboarding process. Multiple markets may share a Guardian registry. Where a registry is shared, its Guardian membership, quorum and screening-progress records apply across the markets using it. Their authority is restricted to collateral screening, reporting and quorum-based account restrictions. They cannot remove bans, alter market parameters, or transfer or freeze user assets.
Contract upgrades and role administration remain under Lido DAO governance and are not delegated to the Lend committees. The complete permissions and restrictions are defined in the Technical Specification and Committees and Privileged Roles specification.
Risks and Limitations
Lido Lend introduces additional security mechanisms, but these do not eliminate the risks associated with lending markets.
The modifications to Morpho Blue may introduce new security risks that are not covered by audits of the upstream implementation. Although accounting is isolated per market, shared infrastructure may expose multiple markets to common failures.
The initial oracle design also relies on collateral issuer-published valuations rather than secondary-market prices. Divergence between these values may affect liquidation and settlement outcomes. Guardian screening similarly depends on off-chain assessments and cannot guarantee that compromised collateral will always be identified.
Fallback Exits do not resolve bad debt. If the borrower at the top of the settlement queue has bad debt, settlement is blocked across the market until the position becomes solvent or the debt is cleared.
The core contracts remain upgradeable until ossification, with upgrade authority retained by the Lido DAO Agent rather than delegated to committees.
Disclaimer
To use Lido Lend, a user must acknowledge and agree that the members of the Guardian Security Councils ("Guardians"), the members of any of the Committees (Lend Risk Steward Committee, Lend Emergency Brakes Committee, Lend Operational Committee) or other body involved in any Lido Lend protocol (“Protocol”) decision, including any committee acting under authority delegated by the Lido DAO (“Protocol Role Holders”), have no liability to the user for any act, omission, error or delay in the performance of their functions. This includes any decision to ban or not to ban an account, to adjust or not to adjust a parameter, or to pause or not to pause a Protocol function. To the maximum extent permitted by law, the user releases each Protocol Role Holder from, and agrees not to bring, any such claim. Protocol Role Holders owe the user no fiduciary or other duty by reason of their functions.
Certain markets in Lido Lend may be restricted in your jurisdiction. Lido Lend consists of permissionless smart contracts that are accessible to anyone. However, access through Lido-maintained front-ends, interfaces and related services is subject to jurisdictional restrictions on a market-by-market basis, as determined under the Lido Lend risk framework and the applicable Terms of Use.
Market Onboarding and Rollout
Approval of this proposal establishes the governance path for adding markets but does not approve any particular market. Each proposed market will require:
- Publication of the five market-defining parameters, supply cap, maturation and settlement configuration, IRM configuration, and Guardian Security Council membership and quorum.
- A Lend Operational Committee Easy Track motion to create the market.
- An Easy Track objection period, during which LDO holders may object to the motion.
- Enactment of the motion only if it is not blocked by objections.
Market activation also includes registering the Lend Risk Steward Committee multisig as the Risk Steward for that market and the Lend Emergency Brakes Committee multisig as the pauser for its controller. Markets may also be created through a direct Lido DAO on-chain vote.
Outcomes of the Vote
If the vote concludes positively:
- The Lido DAO acknowledges the existing administrative role configuration of Lido Lend, under which the Lido DAO Agent, subject to Dual Governance, holds the following authorities:
- Proxy administration: the shared core, IRM router, market controllers, vaults, Guardian registries, and standard oracles.
- Contract ownership: owner of the IRM router and any deployed standard IRM models.
- Role administration: administrator of roles in LidoLendOwner, RiskStewardDashboard, market controllers, and Guardian registries.
- The Lido DAO approves the mandates and composition of the three Lend committees described above.
Lido Lend: Accept Admin Roles and Approve Committee Mandates
Summary
This proposal seeks Lido DAO approval of Lido Lend, a decentralized lending protocol built on a modified fork of Morpho Blue, including its administrative role configuration and proposed committee mandates. Lido Lend is designed around isolated lending markets and three principal mechanisms:
The proposed governance framework includes three multisig committees: the Lend Operational Committee, the Lend Risk Steward Committee and the Lend Emergency Brakes Committee, along with market-specific Guardian Security Councils. The Lido DAO Agent holds contract upgrade and role-administration authority. The Lido Lend Easy Track factories are proposed for registration through separate execution items in the same Aragon vote. This vote does not approve or activate individual lending markets. Market creation, initial market parameters and Guardian Security Council membership will be determined separately, primarily through Easy Track motions that remain open to LDO holder objections.
Motivation and Protocol Design
Lido Lend is designed to address challenges in decentralized lending, particularly situations where lenders cannot withdraw because of insufficient liquidity or where compromised collateral introduces additional risks. The protocol follows a selective approach, with individually configured markets and additional controls over collateral maturation and emergency responses.
The underlying architecture uses a shared lending core with isolated accounting for each market. Every market is defined by five parameters: loan token, collateral token, oracle, interest-rate model (IRM), and Liquidation LTV (LLTV). Once created, these parameters, the controller address, and the settlement setting cannot be changed. Other settings, including supply caps and IRM configuration, may be adjusted through the authorized governance mechanisms.
The protocol introduces three mechanisms to support this design.
Fallback Exits
Fallback Exits provide an alternative withdrawal mechanism when available liquidity is insufficient. Instead of waiting for borrowers to repay, lenders may receive borrower collateral through settlement, with an equivalent amount of debt cancelled at the corresponding oracle valuation and without a liquidation incentive. Settlement targets the borrower at the top of the settlement queue. The queue is ordered by borrow shares per unit of collateral, so in practice this is the borrower with the highest LTV in the market.
Guardian Security Council
Each market has a Guardian Security Council responsible for screening wallet addresses depositing incoming collateral and the addresses from which such collateral originates for compromised assets, illicit activity or attempted protocol abuse.
New collateral counts toward position health immediately but cannot support additional borrowing until it matures.
Guardians submit flags and suspect reports on accounts, and either can extend the maturation time. When flags from distinct Guardians reach the required quorum, the account is banned from new borrowing and collateral maturation. Only a Guardian quorum can ban an account. Granting this authority to anyone else would require a Lido DAO vote.
A ban does not itself prevent repayment, liquidation, settlement, or debt-free collateral withdrawals. Guardians cannot remove bans, but a ban can be lifted through a Lend Operational Committee Easy Track motion. To prevent indefinite restrictions caused by unavailable Guardians, collateral may also mature after a fallback deadline if the required reports have not arrived.
Turbulence Controls
Turbulence Controls provide two levels of market-specific intervention:
Neither mechanism gives the committees custody of, or authority to transfer, user assets.
Governance and Committees
Three multisig committees would operate within defined limits, while the Lido DAO retains authority over contract upgrades and privileged role administration.
Lend Operational Committee. The committee acts exclusively through Easy Track factories, with motions subject to objections by LDO holders. Within the bounds of those factories, its authority includes:
The committee cannot upgrade contracts, administer privileged roles, withdraw user positions, select borrowers for settlement or initiate settlement.
Lend Risk Steward Committee. The committee can act immediately to freeze a market, increase the maturation time, the non-matured capital lock and the supply collateral minimum, and revoke an address's instant maturation privilege. It cannot loosen any setting, unfreeze a market, change fees or interest rates, or upgrade contracts.
Lend Emergency Brakes Committee. The committee acts through
CircuitBreaker, subject to periodic heartbeat requirements. It can trigger one fixed-duration pause for a registered market controller but cannot select its duration, extend or end the pause, or trigger another pause of the same controller without re-registration through a Lend Operational Committee Easy Track motion.Guardian Security Councils. The Councils operate per market. Their members and quorum are established as part of the relevant market's onboarding process. Multiple markets may share a Guardian registry. Where a registry is shared, its Guardian membership, quorum and screening-progress records apply across the markets using it. Their authority is restricted to collateral screening, reporting and quorum-based account restrictions. They cannot remove bans, alter market parameters, or transfer or freeze user assets.
Contract upgrades and role administration remain under Lido DAO governance and are not delegated to the Lend committees. The complete permissions and restrictions are defined in the Technical Specification and Committees and Privileged Roles specification.
Risks and Limitations
Lido Lend introduces additional security mechanisms, but these do not eliminate the risks associated with lending markets.
The modifications to Morpho Blue may introduce new security risks that are not covered by audits of the upstream implementation. Although accounting is isolated per market, shared infrastructure may expose multiple markets to common failures.
The initial oracle design also relies on collateral issuer-published valuations rather than secondary-market prices. Divergence between these values may affect liquidation and settlement outcomes. Guardian screening similarly depends on off-chain assessments and cannot guarantee that compromised collateral will always be identified.
Fallback Exits do not resolve bad debt. If the borrower at the top of the settlement queue has bad debt, settlement is blocked across the market until the position becomes solvent or the debt is cleared.
The core contracts remain upgradeable until ossification, with upgrade authority retained by the Lido DAO Agent rather than delegated to committees.
Disclaimer
To use Lido Lend, a user must acknowledge and agree that the members of the Guardian Security Councils ("Guardians"), the members of any of the Committees (Lend Risk Steward Committee, Lend Emergency Brakes Committee, Lend Operational Committee) or other body involved in any Lido Lend protocol (“Protocol”) decision, including any committee acting under authority delegated by the Lido DAO (“Protocol Role Holders”), have no liability to the user for any act, omission, error or delay in the performance of their functions. This includes any decision to ban or not to ban an account, to adjust or not to adjust a parameter, or to pause or not to pause a Protocol function. To the maximum extent permitted by law, the user releases each Protocol Role Holder from, and agrees not to bring, any such claim. Protocol Role Holders owe the user no fiduciary or other duty by reason of their functions.
Certain markets in Lido Lend may be restricted in your jurisdiction. Lido Lend consists of permissionless smart contracts that are accessible to anyone. However, access through Lido-maintained front-ends, interfaces and related services is subject to jurisdictional restrictions on a market-by-market basis, as determined under the Lido Lend risk framework and the applicable Terms of Use.
Market Onboarding and Rollout
Approval of this proposal establishes the governance path for adding markets but does not approve any particular market. Each proposed market will require:
Market activation also includes registering the Lend Risk Steward Committee multisig as the Risk Steward for that market and the Lend Emergency Brakes Committee multisig as the pauser for its controller. Markets may also be created through a direct Lido DAO on-chain vote.
Outcomes of the Vote
If the vote concludes positively: