How to check the Lido DAO on-chain vote #207

What the vote is about

This document outlines methods to verify all the calls embedded in the Lido DAO on-chain vote #207.

The vote covers the following changes:

  1. Lido Lend: Accept Admin Roles and Approve Committee Mandates | Full proposal on IPFS | Forum discussion | Audits: Lido Lend - Cyfrin, Easy Track factories - MixBytes, Guardian Daemon SDK - MixBytes | Deployment verification: Lido Lend - Cyfrin, Easy Track factories - MixBytes | On-chain items 2-7 register six Lido Lend Easy Track factories to:
    • create and activate markets (item 2)
    • configure CircuitBreaker for markets (item 3)
    • configure Guardians and unban accounts (item 4)
    • configure collateral activation, settlement parameters, supply caps, market fees, and unfreeze markets (item 5)
    • add/remove Risk Stewards for markets (item 6)
    • update market interest-rate model (IRM) configuration (item 7)
  2. Upgrade CMv2 to enable top-up allocation controls, as proposed on the forum | Audits & deployment verification: MixBytes | On-chain items 1.1, 1.2.
  3. Enable CMv2 Consolidation Migrator, as proposed on the forum | Audits: Certora, Statemind | Deployment verification: MixBytes | On-chain item 1.3.
  4. Replace CMv2 Verifier with CuratedVerifier and update CircuitBreaker registration, as proposed on the forum | Audits & deployment verification: MixBytes | On-chain items 1.4-1.9.

Resources for the Proposal Validation

The resources listed in this section are considered trustworthy and reliable.

  • Lido Docs - use this to verify contract addresses
  • Blockchain Explorer Etherscan (or alternatives such as Blockscout) - use this to review contract functionality/inspect methods, and check the current state of contracts
  • Lido Research Forum - use this to access original proposals, review details of proposed changes, and validate modification parameters
  • Snapshot - use this to review pre-approvals for on-chain proposals

Direct links to relevant sources will be provided for each item in the vote, ensuring easy access to the associated information.

Vote Items and Verification Details

How to verify: open the vote at dao.lido.fi/vote/207 and compare its calls with this guide. Each target links to its Lido Docs entry, and each method link opens the exact function on Etherscan.

1.Submit a Dual Governance proposal to enable CMv2 top-up allocation controls, consolidation migration and Curated Verifier for consolidated validators

The call target is Dual Governance. The exact signature here is submitProposal((address,uint96,bytes)[],string).
submitProposal(
The submitProposal method exists on the contract.
[1] tuple[] calls
See 9 parsed calls at 1.1-1.9
Each of the nine calls asks Aragon Agent to execute one call through forward(bytes); the executed calls are the items below. Every submitted ETH value is zero. On dao.lido.fi, each executed call is shown one level deeper, under its Agent call.
[2] string metadata
Enable CMv2 top-up allocation controls, consolidation migration and Curated Verifier for consolidated validators
This is the exact metadata string in the vote bytes. This call submits the proposal; execution of its nine calls is a later step.
)

1.1.Upgrade CMv2 to the implementation with top-up allocation controls and call finalizeUpgradeV2()

The call target is Curated Module v2.
proxy__upgradeToAndCall(
The proxy__upgradeToAndCall method exists on the contract.
[1] address newImplementation_
This is the CuratedModule implementation with top-up allocation controls named in the rollout proposal.
[2] bytes setupCalldata_
0x88984a97
0x88984a97 is exactly the four-byte call to finalizeUpgradeV2(), with no encoded arguments. Its selector is the first four bytes of the Ethereum Keccak-256 hash of finalizeUpgradeV2().
)

Role items (1.2-1.7): check the target, the 32-byte role and the account. Open the pre-filled Keccak link next to each role and compare its result with the role value.

1.2.Grant ENABLE_TOP_UP_ALLOCATION_ROLE to the Curated Module Committee on CMv2

The call target is Curated Module v2.
grantRole(
The grantRole method exists on the contract.
[1] bytes32 role
0xf541c17eb0542b50d1f6df03622f7d9ab80d01dffb50bbd033a4dd4c57f09889
keccak256("ENABLE_TOP_UP_ALLOCATION_ROLE") equals this role value. Compare the full result of the pre-filled Keccak calculator with the role value.
The Curated Module Committee (CMC) receives this role under the proposal. The same CMC is assigned as CuratedVerifier's pauser in item 1.9.
)

1.3.Grant PUBLISH_ROLE to the CMv2 ConsolidationMigrator on Consolidation Bus

The call target is Consolidation Bus.
grantRole(
The grantRole method exists on the contract.
[1] bytes32 role
0xf3156f38966c62e303ac6c7519c63e00636409e3b3ca4abecd13cd0092fee53e
keccak256("PUBLISH_ROLE") equals this role value. Compare the full result of the pre-filled Keccak calculator with the role value.
The CMv2-to-CMv2 ConsolidationMigrator proxy receives this role under the proposal. The role allows the migrator to publish consolidation requests to the bus.
)

1.4.Revoke VERIFIER_ROLE from the previous Verifier on CMv2

The call target is Curated Module v2.
revokeRole(
The revokeRole method exists on the contract.
[1] bytes32 role
0x0ce23c3e399818cfee81a7ab0880f714e53d7672b08df0fa62f2843416e1ea09
keccak256("VERIFIER_ROLE") equals this role value. Compare the full result of the pre-filled Keccak calculator with the role value.
The previous CMv2 Verifier loses this role under the proposal. The corresponding grant is in item 1.6.
)

1.5.Revoke REPORT_REGULAR_WITHDRAWN_VALIDATORS_ROLE from the previous Verifier on CMv2

The call target is Curated Module v2.
revokeRole(
The revokeRole method exists on the contract.
[1] bytes32 role
0xb169cb0459e6d91326174ff566a2fcc3c7bb31ef3d4d83bec1d5679c611ab094
keccak256("REPORT_REGULAR_WITHDRAWN_VALIDATORS_ROLE") equals this role value. Compare the full result of the pre-filled Keccak calculator with the role value.
The previous CMv2 Verifier loses this role under the proposal. The corresponding grant is in item 1.7.
)

1.6.Grant VERIFIER_ROLE to CuratedVerifier on CMv2

The call target is Curated Module v2.
grantRole(
The grantRole method exists on the contract.
[1] bytes32 role
0x0ce23c3e399818cfee81a7ab0880f714e53d7672b08df0fa62f2843416e1ea09
keccak256("VERIFIER_ROLE") equals this role value. Compare the full result of the pre-filled Keccak calculator with the role value.
CuratedVerifier receives this role under the proposal. The corresponding revoke is in item 1.4.
)

1.7.Grant REPORT_REGULAR_WITHDRAWN_VALIDATORS_ROLE to CuratedVerifier on CMv2

The call target is Curated Module v2.
grantRole(
The grantRole method exists on the contract.
[1] bytes32 role
0xb169cb0459e6d91326174ff566a2fcc3c7bb31ef3d4d83bec1d5679c611ab094
keccak256("REPORT_REGULAR_WITHDRAWN_VALIDATORS_ROLE") equals this role value. Compare the full result of the pre-filled Keccak calculator with the role value.
CuratedVerifier receives this role under the proposal. The corresponding revoke is in item 1.5.
)

CircuitBreaker (1.8-1.9): in registerPauser, [1] is the contract that can be paused and [2] is its pauser. These items assign no pauser to the previous Verifier (item 1.8) and the Curated Module Committee to CuratedVerifier (item 1.9).

1.8.Unregister the previous Verifier from the protocol CircuitBreaker

The call target is CircuitBreaker.
registerPauser(
The registerPauser method exists on the contract.
The previous CMv2 Verifier is removed from the protocol CircuitBreaker pauser registry under the replacement proposal.
The zero address unregisters the previous Verifier, as specified by registerPauser.
)

1.9.Register CuratedVerifier on the protocol CircuitBreaker with the Curated Module Committee as pauser

The call target is CircuitBreaker.
registerPauser(
The registerPauser method exists on the contract.
CuratedVerifier is the contract to be paused, per the replacement proposal. On CuratedVerifier, pass the PAUSE_ROLE() result and the protocol CircuitBreaker address to hasRole. A true result confirms the CircuitBreaker holds PAUSE_ROLE.
This call assigns the Curated Module Committee (CMC) as the pauser for CuratedVerifier.
)

2-7. Add six Lido Lend EVM script factories to Easy Track

Easy Track factories (2-7): compare each factory and its full permission string, then split the string into address and selector pairs as in the worked example below. If an explorer cannot show a tuple signature, use the verified ABI or Blockscout with the Keccak link.

The call target is Easy Track.
addEVMScriptFactory(
The addEVMScriptFactory method exists on the contract.
[1] address _evmScriptFactory
per item: column [1] in the table below
See the table below.
[2] bytes _permissions
per item: column [2] in the table below
See the table below.
)

How to Verify Permission Hashes - worked example: item 3

  1. Take exact call data [2] from item 3.
  2. Split after the initial 0x into consecutive 20-byte target addresses (40 hexadecimal characters) and 4-byte selectors (8 hexadecimal characters).
  3. Confirm the target contract address from the linked deployment sources.
  4. Hash the full canonical function signature using Ethereum Keccak-256 and take the first 4 bytes.
  5. Compare the computed selector, target address and complete reassembled raw permission value against call data [2].
Item[1] Factory[2] Permissions · address + selector
2
LidoLendActivateMarket
Match each factory with post 74. Every factory's trustedCaller() returns the Lend Operational Committee Safe 0x4f29aA4c299e17176b48c41D67ee97aE673d29bC, a 5-of-7 Safe (getOwners, getThreshold). Check this factory's trustedCaller().
3
LidoLendCircuitBreakerActions
Check that trustedCaller() returns the committee Safe.
The Lido Lend CircuitBreaker in permission pairs for items 2 and 3 is 0xd0a81a130a303237d338a0b5835edcb011ab3afd. The protocol CircuitBreaker in items 1.8-1.9 is 0x6019cb557978296ba3c08a7b73225c0975dfb2f7. They are separate contracts.
4
LidoLendGuardianActions
Check that trustedCaller() returns the committee Safe.
5
LidoLendMarketManagerActions
Check that trustedCaller() returns the committee Safe.
6
LidoLendRiskStewardActions
Check that trustedCaller() returns the committee Safe.
7
LidoLendApplyIrmConfig
Check that trustedCaller() returns the committee Safe.